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Note 
UNITED STATES V. HARVEY: ARE CRIMINAL DEFENSE FEES 
MORE VULNERABLE THAN NECESSARY? 
In United States v. Haroey 1 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held that Congress may not constitutionally re-
quire convicted racketeers and drug traffickers to forfeit property 
used to pay legitimate defense attorney fees. 2 To the extent that 
such forfeitures and related pre-conviction restraints on transfer are 
authorized by provisions of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 
19843 (the Act), those provisions violate an accused's right to coun-
sel of choice as secured by the sixth amendment.4 
In so holding, the court repudiated the prevailing view among 
district courts that Congress never intended the Act's forfeiture pro-
visions to apply to legitimate attorney fees." The court also rejected 
arguments that the Act violates an accused's basic sixth amendment 
l. 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). The Fourth Circuit consolidated three cases for 
the purposes of this appeal: United States v. Harvey, No. CR-85-224-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 
1985); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986); and United 
States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986). After the three-judge panel issued 
its decision, the United States sought and was granted an en bane rehearing in Reckmi?)'I'T. 
Defendant Harvey was denied a similar petition in his case; no petition for rehearing was 
filed in Bassett. The Fourth Circuit sitting en bane reheard Reckmeyer on October 6, 1987. 
No opinion had been issued when this note went to press. 
2. /d. at 926. 
3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title 11, ch. 3, 98 Stat. 1976, 2040 (1984) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1963 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1982)). The Act was but one chapter in the 
massive Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title 11, 98 
Stat. 1976 (1984), which was the result of years of work by both houses of Congress to 
improve and modernize federal criminal laws. In addition to changing the forfeiture 
provisions, this statutory overhaul reformed sentencing and bail laws, and amended 
drug penalty and insanity defense statutes. SeeS. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-
3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3184. 
The forfeiture provisions have not been the only statutory changes to invite consti-
tutional attack. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-4 73, Title II, ch. 1, 98 Stat. 
1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 and scattered other sections of 18 and 
28 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)), recently withstood fifth and eighth amendment challenges 
in United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). For a uitical analysis of the Bail 
Reform Act, see Comment, Preventive Detention: Libert1· in the Balance, 46 Mo. L. REv. 378 
(1987) (authored by Kevin F. Arthur). . 
4. 814 F.2d at 926. 
5. /d. at 914. Just four days before the Hmvey decision was issued, the United States 
District Court in Utah also rejected this statutory interpretation. In United States v. 
Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Utah 1987), Chief judge jenkins concluded that the Act's 
authors "clearly considered the effect of the bill on a defendant's ability to pay counsel 
322 
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right "not to be denied any counse1"6 or the "discrete right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. " 7 
This note suggests that the court's holding in Haroey was more 
narrowly drawn than necessary, and that as a consequence criminal 
defense attorney fees now may be more vulnerable to forfeiture. 
I. THE STATUTES 
In an effort to "enhance the ... sanction of criminal forfeiture, 
as a law enforcement tool in combatting ... racketeering and drug 
trafficking,"8 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act 
in October 1984. The Act substantially strengthens the forfeiture 
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RIC0)9 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute 
(CCE) 10 in order to "strip ... offenders and organizations of their 
economic power." 11 
Specifically, the Act expands the definition of property that may 
be subject to forfeiture upon conviction to include any real or per-
of choice" and disagreed among themselves as to how that issue should have been 
resolved: 
The fact that there is no mention in the Act that attorneys' fees are exempt 
from the restraining order can only mean that those who favored no exemption 
for attorneys' fees prevailed. The literal language of the statute cannot be read 
to create a special category of transfers and thus to exempt attorneys' fees, 
whether legitimately paid or not. The only issue Congress left to the courts was 
whether or not the provision, as written to encompass attorneys' fees, is 
constitutional. 
/d. at 1556 (footnote omitted). Judge Jenkins ultimately held that the forfeiture provi-
sions violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice and are thus 
unconstitutional as applied to funds or property reasonably necessary to pay attorney 
fees. !d. at 1562. While the Haroey opinion makes no reference to .'llichols, Judge Jenkins 
had the benefit of the briefs submitted by the parties in Haroey. /d. at 1550 n.12. 
6. 814 F.2d at 922 (emphasis in original). 
7. /d. 
8. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374. 
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as Title IX 
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 
(1970)). 
10. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (originally enacted as part of 
Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970)). 
II. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3374. The Senate Report cited a 1981 General Accounting Office 
report entitled Asset Forfeiture-A Seldom Fsed Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking to show 
the inadequacies of then-existing forfeiture provisions. "This bill is intended to elimi-
nate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of for-
feiture by Federal law enforcement agencies." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
192, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3375. 
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sonal, tangible or intangible property or interests "constituting, or 
derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or 
indirectly" from racketeering or drug trafficking.t 2 Under the Act's 
"relation back" provision, the government's interest in property 
subject to forfeiture now arises when the charged offense is commit-
ted, rather than upon conviction. 13 The government is authorized 
to protect that interest through pre- or post-indictment restraining 
orders or injunctions prohibiting property transfers. 14 
Third parties claiming an interest in property subject to forfei-
ture are precluded from intervening in the trial or appeal, or from 
challenging in a separate action the government's interest. 15 
Although the Act does provide an opportunity for third-party claim-
ants to petition the court for post-conviction proceedings to adjudi-
cate the validity of their claims, 16 Congress recognized only two 
justifications for exempting property from forfeiture. First, prop-
erty is not subject to forfeiture if a third party demonstrates an in-
terest superior to that of the defendant at the time of the crime. 17 
Second, no property may be seized from a bona fide purchaser for 
value who, at the time of purchase, was reasonably without cause to 
believe the property was subject to forfeiture. 18 
Although attorney fees are not explicitly mentioned in the 
Act, 19 there seems to be no dispute that an attorney's paid represen-
tation would constitute a bona fide purchase for value20 but for the 
attorney's special and necessary knowledge of both the forfeiture 
law and the sources of the client's property.21 It is precisely this 
dilemma that gives rise to the controversy and the constitutional im-
plications in the forfeiture cases. In each of the three cases consoli-
dated for purposes of appeal in Harvey, the government invoked the 
forfeiture provisions in ways that could have prevented defendants 
from paying legitimate attorney fees, or prevented defense counsel 
from retaining fees already paid. 22 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(b), 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1985). 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. III 1985). 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e), 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (Supp. III 1985). 
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(j), 21 U.S.C. § 853(k) (Supp. III 1985). 
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (Supp. III 1985). 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (Supp. III 1985). 
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Supp. III 1985). 
19. 814 F.2d at 913. 
20. /d. at 914-15 n.4. 
21. /d. at 915. 
22. /d. at 910. 
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II. THE CASES 
In United States v. Reckmeyer 23 the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia granted defense counsel's third-
party petition to modify a post-conviction forfeiture order to permit 
the payment of attorney fees. Defendant Reckmeyer's assets had 
been frozen by a restraining order issued one day before his indict-
ment under the CCE statute. Money to cover legal expenses in-
curred through indictment was placed in escrow. Upon conviction, 
a forfeiture order was entered encompassing virtually all of the as-
sets that could have been used to pay attorney fees. 24 
The court directed the government to pay defense counsel out 
of forfeited assets on the ground that Congress did not intend the 
forfeiture provisions to include legitimate attorney fees, but only 
those fees that were "illusory and fraudulent transfers" designed 
solely to avoid forfeiture. 25 The court's conclusion was predicated 
on the Act's legislative history and was further supported by the 
court's concern that a contrary interpretation would violate a de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice.26 
In United States v. Bassett 27 the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland granted a motion by defendants in a heroin 
trafficking case to exempt their attorney fees from forfeiture under 
the provisions of the CCE statute. The prosecutor had advised 
counsel by letter after the indictment was returned that the govern-
ment would seek forfeiture of the fees upon conviction. 28 The court 
arrived at essentially the same conclusion, and for essentially the 
same reasons, as had the Reckmeyer court just days earlier. 29 
The government's appeals from these two decisions were con-
solidated by the court of appeals with the appeal of defendant Har-
23. 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). 
24. /d. at 1193. 
25. /d. at 1196. 
26. /d. at 1195-96. 
27. 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986),ajf'dsubnom. United Statesv. Harvey, 814 F.2d 
905 (4th Cir. 1987). 
28. /d. at 1309. 
29. /d. at 1317. The Hmve_l' court distinguished the Basset/ and Reckmeyn decisions: 
Unlike the court in Basset/, which found that the Government could not reach 
assets held by any third parties unless the transfer was a sham or otherwise 
fraudulent, the district court [in Reckmeyer] found only that Congress did not 
intend for bona fide attorneys fees to be subject to forfeiture under the CCE. 
814 F.2d at 912. Even if there is some basis in the district court decisions for drawing 
this distinction, it is a distinction without a difference. Both cases dealt only with legiti-
mate attorney fees; no other third-party transfers were at issue. 
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vey from his 1985 conviction under both RICO and CCE statutes.30 
Harvey contended, inter alia, that the trial court's refusal to exempt 
attorney fees from forfeiture violated his sixth amendment right to 
counsel of choice.31 
The court of appeals affirmed the exemption of attorney fees 
from forfeiture in both Bassett and Reckmeyer, although on constitu-
tional rather than statutory grounds.32 The court declined to re-
verse Harvey's conviction, however, despite the validity of his 
constitutional challenge, for reasons relating to the particular facts 
of his trial. 33 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Before reaching the sixth amendment question, the court of ap-
peals explicitly rejected the notion that Congress intended to ex-
empt legitimate attorney fees from the reach of the Act's forfeiture 
provisions.34 The court found the language of the Act so clear, and 
30. United States v. Harvey, No. CR-85-224-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 1985), aff'd, 814 
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). 
31. 814 F.2d at 913. Harvey also argued that a pre-conviction restraining order 
prohibiting use of his assets to retain counsel of his choice violated his procedural due 
process rights under the fifth amendment. The court of appeals agreed, but it found 
that the violation implicated only the deprivation of property that Harvey suffered in the 
absence of an "adequate post-deprivation hearing within a meaningful time." /d. at 931. 
Consequently, reversal of Harvey's conviction would not be an appropriate remedy, the 
court said, adding that the subsequent jury determination of forfeitability rendered en-
try of the restraining order harmless error. Harvey would not be entitled to vacation of 
the order as long as the conviction and accompanying order of forfeiture stood. The 
court declined to consider whether Harvey might be entitled to a civil remedy for the 
temporary violation of his due process rights. /d. This note will not discuss the proce-
dural due process question. 
32. /d. at 929-30. 
33. /d. at 930. After issuing a restraining order barring Harvey from using any of his 
property until the conclusion of trial and all appeals, and refusing to exempt attorney 
fees from that order, the trial court appointed substantially the same defense team as 
Harvey had retained before the order. The court of appeals found denial of counsel of 
choice "at least arguable" under these circumstances. /d. Recognizing, however, that 
Harvey might not have received the same legal sn1•ire he would have received without 
the restraining order, the court affirmed the conviction without prejudice to Harvey's 
right to challenge the conviction on constitutional grounds in collateral proceedings. 
Such proceedings, the court said, would provide the proper context for deciding 
whether the reduced fees and support resources allowed under the appointment order 
significantly diminished the effectiveness of counsel. !d. at 930-31. The trial court had 
denied most of defense counsel's motions to increase the number of attorneys ap-
pointed and to retain various experts with public funds. As a result, the defense argued 
that its "preparation for trial bore no resemblance to the preparation that normally 
would and should, but could not, be undertaken prior to a trial of this magnitude." /d. 
at 912. 
34. !d. at 913. 
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so plainly to the contrary, as to preclude any resort to legislative 
history for guidance in statutory interpretation.35 
Acknowledging that most of the district courts addressing the 
issue believed otherwise, 36 the court undertook its own survey of the 
legislative history. While agreeing with Bassett and Reckmeyer that 
Congress primarily intended the Act to preclude "sham and fraudu-
lent transfers,"37 the court found nothing that wouldjustify limiting 
the scope of the forfeiture provisions to such transactions. Quite 
the contrary, the court found a "clear congressional intent to make 
voidable a wider range of asset transfers."38 
Finally, the court refused to find that merely raising serious 
constitutional questions justified a "saving" interpretation of the 
Act by the courts.39 Although courts are bound to interpret ambig-
uous statutes in a way most consistent with constitutionality, the 
court found no ambiguity here.40 
IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The court then turned to the sixth amendment questions raised 
by the parties and the various district courts:41 
First and, in light of the court's ultimate decision, foremost, is 
the defendant's qualified right to counsel of choice violated by or-
ders that restrain transfer of legitimate attorney fees or by the threat 
35. !d. 
36. !d. at 913 n.3. The court cited United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. 
Wis. 1986); United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1986); United States 
v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. 
Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressly disagreeing with Payden, cited infra, from the same 
district); and United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985). The court 
cited as contrary authority United States v. Harvey, No. CR-85-224-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 
1985) (affirmed on this appeal); and In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated 
January 2, 1985 (Payden), 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressly disagreeing with 
Rogers analysis). 
37. 814 F.2d at 916. 
38. /d. at 917. 
39. /d. 
40. /d. at 918. 
41. !d. at 918-19. The court also considered the substantive due process right to a 
fundamentally fair trial under the fifth amendment, but treated it as so closely related to 
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel as to present no truly sepa-
rate issue. /d. at 922. As Justice O'Connor explained: 
The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it 
defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions 
of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defence." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). 
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of ultimate forfeiture, because private attorneys will decline such 
cases without some assurance that they will be paid?42 
Next, is the basic sixth amendment right to counsel jeopardized 
if the potential for forfeiture renders a defendant unable to retain 
private counsel, yet not so indigent as to qualify for a court-
appointed attorney ?43 
Finally, even when private counsel is retained, is a defendant's 
right to the effective assistance of counsel threatened by condition-
ing the attorney's payment upon ignorance of the source of the cli-
ent's assets or their potential forfeitability?44 
The court answered the last of these questions with a single 
paragraph endorsing the position of the government and others45 
that the effectiveness of counsel, and the corresponding fifth 
amendment right to a fundamentally fair trial, could only be deter-
mined after conviction, precluding any earlier constitutional chal-
lenge to the Act.46 The court gave the second question equally 
short shrift by suggesting that a defendant's inability to obtain any 
counsel at all simply could not arise absent judicial abuse.47 Only 
42. 814 F.2d at 921. The court cited Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932), as 
exemplary authority for the right to counsel of choice. In Powell, the notorious "Scotts-
boro Boys" case, seven black defendants were convicted in Scottsboro, Alabama, of rap-
ing two white girls on a train. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction 
on the ground that the trial court's failure to give the defendants "reasonable time and 
opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process." /d. at 71. In his opin-
ion for the Court, Justice Sutherland asserted that the opportunity to which a defendant 
is entitled is a "fair opportunity to secure counsel of his choice." /d. at 53. 
Since Powell the right to counsel of choice has been refined primarily by decisions 
explaining just how fair that "fair opportunity" must be. Many such decisions have in-
volved the denial of counsel of choice when exercise of that right would require a con-
tinuance. See, e.g., Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 211 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Every person 
has a constitutional right to retain at his own expense his own counsel so long as that 
right does not unreasonably interfere with the normal progress of a criminal case."); 
United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979) ("While the right to select a 
particular person as counsel is not an absolute right, the arbitrary dismissal of a defend-
ant's attorney of choice violates a defendant's right to counsel."). 
43. 814 F.2d at 921 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). for the 
"minimal or basic" sixth amendment right to counsel). Among the district court forfei-
ture decisions, supra note 36, the court singled out United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. 
Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), as raising this question in particular. 
44. 814 F.2d at 921 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
45. See Brickey, Forfeiture of Attome;•s ·Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Fmfeilurrs on the 
Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REv. 493, 529-32 ( 1986) (no sixth amendment right litigable 
before conviction). 
46. 814 F.2d at 922. 
47. /d. The court found the "worst possible effect" of the Act's application would 
only be to force indigence upon the defendant, creating a right to appointed counsel. 
Only a "follow-up refusal to appoint any counsel" would violate the "minimal" sixth 
amendment right. /d. 
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the defendant's qualified right to counsel of choice was found to be 
implicated by the forfeiture provisions.48 
To reach this conclusion, the court asserted that the framers of 
the Constitution envisioned representation by private attorneys as 
the primary right secured by the sixth amendment against govern-
ment encroachment.49 It would therefore be patently unconstitu-
tional for Congress to legislate direct restrictions on a defendant's 
selection of an attorney or on the amount of money that counsel 
could be paid. If Congress is forbidden to do so directly, the court 
reasoned, then it may not do so indirectly through unlimited freeze 
orders and the threat of forfeiture. 5° 
Acknowledging that the right to counsel of choice may be lim-
ited by countervailing governmental interests,51 the court neverthe-
less reached the same conclusion by balancing individual against 
governmental interests in the context of criminal forfeiture. Be-
cause the right to counsel was created to protect the guilty as well as 
the innocent, the court argued, it must have been created with the 
certain knowledge that ill-gotten gains would be used to exercise 
it.52 Therefore, the government's interest in deterrence, in preserv-
ing its property, and in stripping racketeers of their economic base 
must yield to the defendant's interest in using assets to retain coun-
sel, even if those assets are tainted by crime. 5 3 
V. ANALYSIS 
To be sure, the Harvey decision substitutes a clear constitutional 
mandate for a rather strained statutory interpretation as the justifi-
cation for courts' exempting legitimate attorney fees from RICO 
48. /d. at 922-23. The court suggested that the government, the defendants, and the 
parties all found the right to counsel of choice to be the sixth amendment component 
"most seriously drawn in issue by the forfeiture of attorneys' fees." See id. 
49. /d. at 923. The court cited Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207,209 (6th Cir. 1981). in 
which the Sixth Circuit had declared: 
The right to choose one's own counsel is an essential component of the 
Sixth Amendment because, were a defendant not provided the opportunity to 
select his own counsel at his own expense, substantial risk would arise that the 
basic trust between counsel and client, which is a cornerstone of the adversarv 
system, would be undercut. · 
50. 814 F.2d at 924. 
51. /d. Judge Phillips cited his own opinion in Sampley v. Attorney General, 786 
F.2d 610,613 (4th Cir. 1986), in which he had stated, "The limit of the right [to counsel 
of choice] is necessarily found in the countervailing [governmental] interest against 
which the sixth amendment right provides explicit protection: the interest in proceed-
ing with prosecutions on an orderly and expeditious basis .... " 
52. 814 F.2d at 924-25. 
53. ld. at 925. 
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and CCE forfeiture provisions.54 Nevertheless, one is left with the 
uneasy feeling that the exemption is on a less secure footing than it 
might have been.55 
54. The court's rejection of the prevailing view that the Act's forfeiture provisions 
were never meant to touch legitimate attorney fees is quite compelling. whether the 
analysis is by rules of statutory construction or by recourse to legislative history. In the 
latter vein, the court might have added that the Act's authors cited with apparent ap-
proval United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981 ), in describing the "relation 
back" mechanism of the Act. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., I st Sess. 200 n.28, reprinted in 
1984 U.S. CoDE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 3I82, 3383 n.28. The Long court, in a pre-
amendment recognition of the same underlying policy, held that property derived from 
a violation of CCE remained subject to criminal forfeiture although transferred to the 
defendant's attorneys before conviction, and that an order restraining the attorneys 
from transferring or selling the property was properly entered. 
Other courts looking back at Long dismissed it as inapplicable here on the ground 
th11t the transaction between Long and his lawyers appeared to have been in the nature 
of a "sham transfer." United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1318 (D. Md. 1986); 
see also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985). These courts 
miss the point. The note about Long in the Senate Report makes no allegation of sham 
or fraudulent transfer. For the purpose of illustrating the principle involved, it appar-
ently made no difference to the Act's authors whether the transfer was legitimate or 
otherwise. Had they intended to treat the two cases differently, the distinction would 
surely have been raised. 
55. In part, this uneasiness must derive from the court's convincing demolition of 
the prevailing statutory interpretation. The court itself made the point that there is 
comfort in the notion that Congress could not have intended to do something that 
seems utterly contrary to our adversary system. 814 F.2d at 914-15. Perhaps, in its 
quest for a constitutional holding the court abandoned statutory interpretation prema-
turely, giving Congress less credit than it merited. 
The greater cause of this discomfort may be the court's exclusion of all save one 
rather frail component of the sixth amendment right to counsel upon which to base the 
exemption of legitimate attorney fees. The United States Supreme Court just might 
accept the entire Haroey rationale, but then find that the government's interest in depriv-
ing racketeers and drug traffickers of their booty simply outweighs a right to counsel of 
choice that may be exercised only by those who can afford it and is, itself, riddled with 
exceptions and exclusions. For a discussion of the limitations on the sixth amendment 
right to counsel of choice, see infra note 67. 
In Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1982), for example, the Court clearly demonstrated 
its hostility to any expansion of the right to counsel of choice. In the majority opinion, 
Justice White concededly went far out of his way to reject what he saw as a "novel Sixth 
Amendment right" to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship" asserted by the Ninth 
Circuit to justify reversal of a conviction following denial of a continuance. /d. at 13-14. 
In so doing, he appeared to "balance" the defendant's interest against "the interest of 
the victim of these crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial in this case." 
/d. 
Notwithstanding this language, the "relationship" test urged by the Ninth Circuit 
arguably was not a new right at all, but merely a factor to be weighed in balancing the 
defendant's right to counsel of choice against the government's interest in the orderly 
administration of justice. /d. at 16-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). Seen in 
that light, Justice White's rejection of the doctrine can be fairly viewed as supporting the 
proposition that the Haroey decision is vulnerable to reversal on the facts even if the 
legal logic were found acceptable. 
The Haroey court correctly determined, under Brennan's analysis, that the right to 
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The remaining sections of this note will discuss how the exemp· 
tion of legitimate attorney fees from forfeiture might have been 
placed on a broader, stronger foundation by affirming that the statu· 
tory language itself provides some latitude for judicial exemptions, 
and by finding a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel 
presumptively violated without an exemption. 
A. Latitude for judicial Exemptions from Forfeiture 
The Fourth Circuit held that the literal import of the Act "con-
templates the forfeiture of attorney fees in any circumstances where 
the attorney cannot establish that he was 'without reasonable cause 
to believe that the property [used to pay the fees] was subject to 
forfeiture.' " 56 But the decision offered no support for such a 
sweeping pronouncement beyond those arguments that directly re-
fute the equally sweeping, and diametrically opposite, pronounce-
ments of the Bassett and Reckmeyer courts. 
On close examination of the statutory language, particularly as 
interpreted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Thier, 5 7 judicial exemption of legitimate attor-
ney fees appears to be justifiable on grounds that need not rise to 
the level of constitutional rights. By affirming the Bassett decision on 
these narrower grounds, the Fourth Circuit might have preserved 
the possibility of such exemptions against a constitutional reversal 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
While the statute clearly mandates forfeiture of covered prop-
erty upon conviction, it uses the permissive "may" to give trial 
courts discretion as to the pre-conviction restraints on property 
transfers that may be imposed at the government's request.58 These 
provisions explicitly limit the availability to the government of pre-
conviction restraints, 59 but place no limitations whatsoever on the 
discretion of the courts to deny, wholly or partially, the govern-
ment's application. Nor does the statute discuss what criteria a trial 
court must use in making that decision. 
Accordingly, the Thier court referred to traditional criteria for 
counsel of choice was violated. Given the inconclusive quality of this right, however. the 
court should not have been so quick to dismiss the other components of the sixth 
amendment right to counsel which may also have been implicated. 
56. 814 F.2d at 918. 
57. 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (1987). Sl'l' also United 
States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (D. Colo. 1985). 
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e), 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (Supp. Ill 1985). 
59. See id. 
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issuing preliminary injunctions, which require, inter alia, a showing 
that the threatened injury to the plaintiffs must outweigh the harm 
the injunction might do the defendants.U0 In this context, the Thier 
court said, the trial court must weigh the "possible adverse effects of 
a pretrial refusal to exempt defense counsel's fee from forfeiture" 
against the government's interest in protecting potentially forfeita-
ble property. 61 
The Thier court denied that such balancing compels any particu-
lar result;62 hence, exemption cannot be considered a constitutional 
mandate. But the holding necessarily implies that the trial court has 
statutory authority to exempt legitimate attorney fees from pre-
conviction restraint.63 Any such exemption would be of little practi-
cal significance if those fees were then subject to forfeiture on con-
viction, so the exemption ought permanently to negate any 
government interest. 
In Bassett there was no government motion for a pre-conviction 
restraining order, but the opportunity for the trial court to exercise 
its discretion arose with the government's pretrial notice to defense 
counsel of intent to seek forfeiture of attorney fees upon conviction. 
Both devices have precisely the same adverse effect on the attor-
neys' opportunity to receive legitimate payment under the third-
party claims provisions of RICO and CCE.64 It follows that defend-
. 60. 801 F.2d at 1470. 
61. /d. at 1474. 
62. /d. In fact, Thier was decided solely on the ground that the trial court's refusal to 
grant the defendant any hearing at all before issuing a forfeiture order violated his fifth 
amendment right to procedural due process. 
63. This may be the true import of the passage in the legislative history suggesting 
that no provision of the Act relating to pretrial restraining orders "is intended to inter-
fere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 1 at 19 n.l (1984). As long as trial courts have the discretion to exempt 
legitimate attorney fees from forfeiture, sixth amendment rights are not necessarily at 
risk. The passage continues: "The [House Judiciary] Committee, therefore, does not 
resolve the conflict in District Court opinions on the use of restraining orders that im-
pinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a criminal case." /d. Unless one reads the 
second sentence as a willful abdication of the legislative responsibility to enact only con-
stitutional laws, it must mean that the Act's authors saw no need to resolve the conflict 
because courts could readily avoid the problem. See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. 
Supp. 1332, 1343 (0. Colo. 1985) (finding intent by Congress to permit trial courts to 
exercise discretion). 
64. The government essentially concedes this point. See Justice Department GuidelineJ 
on Forfeiture of AttorneyJ' FeeJ, 38 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001 (Oct. 2, 1985) [hereinafter 
Justice GuidelineJ]. These guidelines make it somewhat more difficult for prosecutors to 
seize attorney fees by requiring actual knowledge by the attorney of the susceptibility of 
those fees to forfeiture. 
Under these guidelines ... the only assets which an attorney conclusively would 
be held to have actual knowledge of forfeitability are those specifically named 
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ant Bassett should be entitled to the same judicial consideration that 
the statute affords to defendant Thier. 
Although the Bassett court never explicitly conducted the bal-
ancing suggested in Thier, its decision leaves no room for doubt that 
it would find Bassett's interests to outweigh the govemment's.65 
The Harvey court thus could have affirmed Bassett on the ground that 
the trial court was merely exercising its statutory discretion.66 
B. Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The exemption from forfeiture of legitimate attorney fees 
would be on much stronger constitutional grounds if the Harvey 
court had not so quickly dismissed the "effective assistance of coun-
sel" component of the sixth amendment right.67 Ironically, the 
in the indictment or subject to a restraining order or civil forfeiture proceed-
ing. . . . [T]he Department believes it is inappropriate to give written notice to 
an attorney that a particular asset or that all assets belonging to a defendant are 
from an illegitimate source or subject to forfeiture simply to meet the require-
ment of actual knowledge imposed by these guidelines. 
Sending written notice of the forfeitability of assets that are not specifically 
described or under restraint no doubt would be attacked as impermissibly in-
terfering with the qualified right to counsel of choice. The argument could be 
made that if the notice is not based upon a probable cause determination that 
the assets are subject to forfeiture, it was sent only to harass the attorney or 
cause him to abandon the case and not because the asset is legitimately subject 
to forfeiture. 
/d. at 3006. 
65. Although the Bassett holding is based on a statutory interpretation, the court as-
serts that a contrary ruling would violate Bassett's constitutional rights. 632 F. Supp. at 
1317-18. Thus, any balancing would pit a constitutional right against mere legislative 
policy. 
66. Such a holding could be expanded, perhaps, to establish the availability under 
the statute of a discretionary exemption whenever the forfeiture of legitimate attorney 
fees is clearly threatened by any governmental action, including the indictment itself, 
that would automatically disqualify counsel from mounting a successful third-party 
claim. Thier, 80 I F.2d at 14 74 ("[T]he defense attorney's necessary knowledge of the 
charges against his client cannot defeat his interest in receiving payment out of the de-
fendant's forfeited assets for legitimate legal services."). While the remedy still falls 
short of the blanket exemption from forfeiture that a constitutional holding would pro-
vide, it might survive a possible reversal of the Hamey court's sixth amendment 
interpretation. 
67. It is instructive to review, though unnecessary to dispute, the Haroey court's anal-
ysis of the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice in order to appreciate the fragility 
of the court's constitutional holding. The court concedes that the right is qualified by 
the government's countervailing interest in the orderly administration of justice, that it 
contemplates only the "fair opportunity" to choose one's counsel, and that it does not 
embrace any guarantee of a "meaningful attorney-client relationship." 814 F.2d at 923-
24 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,53 (1932); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-
14 (1983)). The court also acknowledges that the right may be lost to an accused in 
several ways-among them, in rem forfeitures and jeopardy tax assessments-without 
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starting point for holding that the Act violates a defendant's right to 
effective assistance of counsel can be found within Haroey itself. 
Conceding that specific applications of the Act could result in 
effectiveness violations, the Fourth Circuit insisted that such viola-
tions could only be determined after conviction.68 The "mere pos-
sibility" of violation could not subject the Act to constitutional 
challenge before conviction.69 Rather, such a challenge should be 
pursued in a collateral proceeding to determine whether counsel 
was actually ineffective and whether actual prejudice occurred under 
the test of Strickland v. Washington. 70 
Strickland does indeed provide the appropriate test for actual 
and prejudicial ineffectiveness of counset7 1 But the Strickland Court 
went to some lengths to distinguish the facts of that case from 
others in which the ineffectiveness claim was "based on state inter-
ference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance to 
the accused."72 In such cases "the surrounding circumstances 
necessarily violating sixth amendment rights. /d. at 925-26. While the court distin-
guishes the criminal forfeitures at issue here, the distinctions in no way defeat the 
analogy. 
68. 814 F.2d at 922. 
69. /d. (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 71 
(1961), for the proposition that "[m]erely potential impairment of constitutional rights 
under a statute does not of itself create a justiciable controversy in which the nature and 
extent of those rights may be litigated."). 
70. 466 u.s. 668 (1984). 
71. See id. at 687. The Strickland Court set forth a two-part test: 
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as 
to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction 
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that ren-
ders the result unreliable. 
/d. The Court wenl on to clarify the relationship between the two prongs of the test: 
"The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional erro•·s, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reason-
able probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." /d. 
at 694. Furthermore, the Court stressed that, although it had set forth the two compo-
nents of the test in a particular order, "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffec-
tive assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both 
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing of one." /d. at 
697. 
72. /d. at 683 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). In Cronic, de-
cided the same day as Strickland, the United States Supreme Court rejected a formulaic 
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[make] it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assist-
ance that ineffectiveness [is] properly presumed without inquiry into 
actual performance at trial. " 73 
The Haroey court simply failed to consider the possibility that 
the conflict of interest between counsel and client established by the 
forfeiture provisions of the Act, particularly the "ignorance of for-
feitability" test under the bona fide purchaser exception, could cre-
ate precisely the kind of circumstances referred to in Strickland. If it 
does, there is no need to inquire into counsel's actual performance, 
no need to await conviction, and no need to attack collaterally. 
Even the strongest supporters of the forfeiture provisions as ap-
plied to attorney fees concede there might well be a conflict of inter-
est between attorney and accused.74 Counsel might be tempted to 
plead a client guilty to a lesser offense not punishable by forfeiture, 
or reject a plea bargain that includes forfeiture, even though such 
action is contrary to the client's best interest. Although supporters 
have suggested various mechanisms by which such conflicts may be 
mitigated/5 the conflict itself is inherent in the statute. 
approach developed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for 
determining the effectiveness of counsel by inference from the surrounding circum-
stances, without reference to errors made at trial. Significantly, however, the Cronic 
Court reaffirmed the proposition that circumstances could be present in which, 
"although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any 
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a 
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the 
trial." 466 U.S. at 659-60. 
73. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 661. Justice Brennan, who quoted this sentence from Cronic in 
his opinion in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 702 (Brennan,]., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part), had earlier characterized this class of cases as involving an impermissible inter-
ference with the discharge of a defense counsel's "normal functions." Morris v. Slappy, 
461 U.S. I, 26 ( 1982) (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan sought to distinguish between 
impermissible interference and ineffective assistance as two varieties of sixth amend-
ment violations. Only for the latter would a showing of prejudice have to be made at 
trial. 
It now appears that Brennan's rather strained efforts were unnecessary. Several of 
the cases cited by Brennan to support his argument in .Horns were noted by Justice Ste-
vens in his majority opinion in Cronic as illustrative of "presumed ineffectiveness." See 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661 & n.28 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) 
(court's failure to appoint separate counsel for jointly represented codefendants); Glas-
ser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (court's appointment of one defendant's counsel 
as codefendant's attorney); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (court's ineffective 
appointment of counsel)). Thus, "ineffective assistance" may either be demonstrated at 
trial or presumed from surrounding circumstances. 
74. See Brickey, supra note 45, at 534. 
75. /d. at 536-38 (suggesting adherence to the justice Guidelines, as discussed at supm 
note 64). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 
(Payden), 605 F. Supp. 839, 849-50 n.l4 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (suggesting either a bifurcation 
of trial or use of civil forfeiture provisions). 
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The United States Supreme Court has already held that a con-
flict of interest can be sufficient grounds for finding ineffective 
assistance of counsel if the conflict has adversely affected counsel's 
performance. 76 The Court has also held that the government neces-
sarily violates the right to effective assistance of counsel when it in-
terferes with the ability of counsel. to make independent decisions 
about how to conduct the defense. 77 In the conflict created by the 
prospect of forfeiture, counsel is forced to make decisions as to the 
conduct of the defense in an environment colored by a competing 
interest. When, as in this case, the government has caused the con-
flic.t to occur, the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance must be pre-
sumed without inquiry into actual performance. 
The Harvey court might have used such an argument, in addi-
tion to the counsel of choice theory, to affirm the Reckmeyer order. 
Reckmeyer pleaded guilty to violations of drug trafficking and fed-
eral tax laws, yet even so incurred legal fees of $170,512.78 Had 
Reckmeyer stood trial on those counts, his legal fees-and the costs 
incurred by his counsel-presumably would have been far greater. 
With all of Reckmeyer's assets at risk of forfeiture, his attorneys 
clearly had an interest in limiting their exposure to loss. Surely such 
a conflict is constitutionally impermissible without any need to in-
quire as to whether counsel's representation of Reckmeyer was actu-
ally affected. 79 
76. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 
(1980)). Cuyler is one of a line of conflict-of-interest cases involving defense counsel's 
representation of multiple clients whose interests do not coincide. Its direct antecedents 
are Glasser and Holloway, cited supra note 73. Cuyler held that "[i]n order to establish a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised 110 objection at trial must demon-
strate [to a reviewing court] that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his law-
yer's performance." 446 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added). But Cuyler did not disturb the 
holding in Glasser that a trial court's failure to remedy an actual conflict of interest, 
timely brought to its attention, constitutes a violation of the defendant's right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel without reference to the lawyer's conduct of the trial or preju-
dice to the defendant, 315 U.S. at 75. 
77. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344. The Court cited Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 
(1976) (bar on attorney-client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New 
York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 
U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (requirement that defendant be first witness); and Ferguson v. 
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 593-96 (1961) (bar on direct examination of defendant). 
78. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986), affa sub 
nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). 
79. It is at least arguable that the Harvey court did indeed find a violation of the sixth 
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, but felt compelled to mislabel it, 
presumably to preserve the "tradition" of declining to hear such challenges on direct 
appeal. 814 F.2d at 930. Indeed, the court seems so bound to the doctrine that ineffec-
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Harvey decision discarded a clearly strained statutory inter-
pretation as the basis for exempting legitimate attorney fees from 
forfeiture under RICO and CCE statutes. Instead, the court predi-
cated such exemptions exclusively on the qualified right to counsel 
of choice under the sixth amendment. In so doing, the court left the 
exemptions unnecessarily vulnerable. 
A stronger constitutional argument for exempting attorney fees 
could have been made in the Harvey cases by relying additionally on 
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. More-
over, there is ample justification for a statutory interpretation giving 
trial courts the discretion to exempt attorney fees from forfeiture 
before conviction. Either approach would have better protected the 
integrity of our adversarial process from the wholly unnecessary and 
unwarranted accretion of prosecutorial advantage represented by 
the actual or even threatened forfeiture of legitimate attorney fees. 
ERIC B. EASTON 
tiveness can only be attacked after conviction that it bends over backwards to link obvi-
ous effectiveness questions to the issue of counsel of choice. 
For example, the court explicitly finds that the Act jeopardizes the individual's 
interest in having effectively armed private counsel, which means at the very 
minimum counsel sufficiently informed to mount an effective defense or other-
wise provide effective assistance. This necessary assumption of the adversarial 
system ... is also effectively undercut-practically emasculated-by provisions 
of the Act which make counsel's very ability to retain legitimately contracted 
fees dependent upon his not being fully informed. 
!d. at 925. But then, without further explanation, the court states: "This, it must be 
emphasized, goes not to the right to effective assistance of counsel, but to the primary 
right to representation by privately retained counsel of choice." /d. 
